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The recent debate in Germany about nuclear sharing confirmed the broad support among 
decision-makers for continued involvement in the political dimension of NATO’s sharing ar-
rangements, i. e., participation in the Alliance’s nuclear consultative bodies. At the same time, 
German decision-makers hold divergent views on continued participation in the operational 
and technical aspects of nuclear sharing. Russia’s arsenal of approximately 2,000 tactical nu-
clear weapons is of great concern to Germany and many in Berlin are worried that Russia is 
systematically expanding its nuclear arsenal. German decision-makers and the government 
support NATO’s dual-track policy of deterring and engaging Russia. German policy-mak-
ers’ arguments on the added military value of forward-deployed US nuclear weapons remain 
vague and there are few specific ideas about what type of arms control would be best suited to 
reduce the role and number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. There are four frameworks 
in which tactical nuclear weapons could be discussed with Russia, namely the nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT), other multilateral fora, the Russian — US bilateral dialogue on 
strategic stability, and the NATO — Russia Council. If Russia is serious about reducing the role 
and number of nuclear weapons in Europe, it should accept the reciprocity paradigm and drop 
some worn-out demands and positions that have little relevance for political debates around 
arms control in Berlin and elsewhere.
Keywords: nuclear arms control, tactical nuclear weapons, NATO, Germany.
In spring 2020, a lively debate erupted in Germany on the risks and benefits of the 
deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe and Berlin’s continued involvement in the 
operational aspects of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements.
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In mid-April the Germany’s conservative Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karren-
bauer had announced plans to replace Germany’s current fleet of Tornado dual-capable 
aircraft (DCA) with 90 Eurofighter Typhoon and 45 US F-18 fighter aircraft. Thirty of 
these F-18 would be certified to carry US nuclear weapons.
The leader of the Social Democrat parliamentary group, challenged this decision in 
a May 2  interview with Der Tagesspiegel. Rolf Mützenich called for changes in NATO’s 
nuclear sharing arrangements by stating that “it is about time, that Germany in the future 
excludes the deployment” of nuclear weapons on its territory. His party’s leadership later 
backed the initiative. The German Social Democrats (SPD) are coalition partners of the 
conservative Christian Democrat Union (CDU) [1].
The debate about nuclear sharing confirmed the broad support among German de-
cision-makers for continued deterrence of Russia as well as German participation in the 
political dimension of sharing arrangements, i. e. participation in NATO’s nuclear consul-
tative bodies. (The Federal Republic of) Germany has always seen nuclear consultations 
as an instrument to stay informed about the nuclear policies of nuclear-armed allies in 
order to prevent changes that it views as detrimental to its own security [2]. This includes 
particularly German influence on the US nuclear force posture in Europe and associated 
nuclear doctrines. Germany’s involvement in the Alliance’s integrated nuclear force plan-
ning and standing arrangements for nuclear consultations in NATO’s Nuclear Planning 
Group and High Level Group have been core elements of this policy [3].
At the same time, German decision-makers hold divergent views on continued par-
ticipation in the operational and technical aspects of nuclear sharing, which currently 
involves hosting US nuclear weapons and providing dual-capable aircraft as means of de-
livery.
Opponents of the continued deployment of US nuclear weapons in Germany argue 
that the forward-basing of nuclear weapons in Europe provides no added military value. 
They maintain that the Trump administration’s unilateral approach to NATO has deval-
ued nuclear sharing arrangements. By contrast, proponents of the NATO nuclear status 
quo emphasize the need for continued deterrence of Russia and the political importance 
of burden-sharing arrangements.
German experts and decision-makers debated NATO and Russian nuclear weapons 
in the context of four broader discussions: first, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 led 
to renewed debates about (nuclear) deterrence. Second, since Donald Trump’s election in 
2016, German analysts and decision-makers have discussed whether Germany (or Eu-
rope) needs its own nuclear weapons [4]. Third, there is an ongoing debate on the con-
sequences of the demise of the INF treaty. Fourth, Germans continue to debate the value 
of German involvement in military and political dimensions of nuclear sharing arrange-
ments. All four discussions are interwoven in various ways and provide the background 
for how Germany debates nuclear deterrence and possible arms control measures to re-
duce nuclear stockpiles in Europe.
This article unpacks the Russian aspect of the German debate on tactical nuclear 
weapons1. It briefly summarises how Russia’s nuclear posture in Europe is perceived by 
Germans and outlines how German politicians and decision-makers view the role of nu-
clear deterrence and the prospects for arms control with Russia. The article then looks at 
1 In the context of this article tactical nuclear weapons encompass all non-strategic nuclear weapons 
with ranges not covered by the (now defunct) INF treaty and the New START accord.
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four different settings in which tactical nuclear weapons might be discussed with Russia. 
It suggests some actions Moscow could take to facilitate progress on reducing nuclear 
weapons in Europe and argues that a proactive Russian policy of reducing the role and 
number of nuclear weapons would foster changes in NATO’s nuclear posture.
The debate on nuclear arms control does not take place in a vacuum and has to be 
seen as one element of relations between Germany and Russia. Since 2014, Germany’s 
Russia policy has been hotly debated. Those who have argued that Berlin should pursue 
a dual-track approach of deterrence and engagement vis-à-vis Moscow have consistently 
been losing ground. The German government sees the Russian state as responsible for the 
March 2018 poisoning of former Russian spy Victor Skripal in the United Kingdom, cyber 
attacks on the German Bundestag, the assassination of a Georgian citizen in central Berlin 
in August 2019 and the poisoning of Alexei Navalny in August 2020. Such actions have 
strengthened the hands of those who argue that engagement with Moscow has yielded no 
results. These developments also influence perceptions of the likelihood and desirability of 
nuclear arms control with Russia. At the same time, actions by Moscow to reduce nuclear 
threats can have a positive impact on how Berlin views Russia’s role in European security.
Disparities of non-strategic weapons stockpiles
Russia’s arsenal of approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons is of great concern 
to Germany. The German government sees “the systematic expansion of the Russian 
arsenal of short- and medium-range and the deployment of such systems close to the 
NATO border” [5, p. 106] as part of a broader trend of Russia increasing reliance on nu-
clear deterrence. Berlin cites the deployment of nuclear-capable Iskander missile in Ka-
liningrad and near St. Petersburg, the deployment of Kalibr missiles in the Baltic Sea and 
the 9M729 cruise missile, which NATO countries believe to be of an intermediate-range, 
as specific examples why it feels threatened by Russia’s nuclear weapons. Moscow’s nuclear 
weapons policy, in Berlin’s view, leads to a “constant increase of disparity and a Russian ad-
vantage in short- and medium-range missiles” compared to short- and intermediate-range 
NATO and US nuclear capabilities [5, p. 106]. This trend, the German Defence Minister 
argues, “severely disrupts the strategic and potentially the nuclear balance in Europe” [5].
The United States presumably has around 230 tactical nuclear weapons, all of which 
are B61 bombs. About 150 of these are believed to be stationed in Europe and are assigned 
to NATO as part of nuclear sharing. These free-fall bombs are deployed in Belgium, Ger-
many, Italy, the Netherlands (which provide their own aircraft for delivery of these weap-
ons), as well as in Turkey (which presumably does not provide such dual-capable aircraft). 
About 20  B61  are believed to be stationed at Büchel airbase, in the West of Germany, 
for delivery by German Tornado aircraft. Under nuclear sharing “[a]llies plan and train 
together to implement the [Alliance’s] nuclear mission in the extremely remote circum-
stance when escalation has occurred and a decision to use nuclear weapons is taken” [6]. 
The German government values these arrangements because of their presumed security 
benefits and because they are expected to provide Germany with influence on NATO’s 
nuclear policy [7, e. g. p. 257]2.
2 The United States in November 2019 has also begun to deploy low-yield nuclear warheads on Trident 
SLBMs but it is unclear how many of these new warheads will eventually be deployed and whether any of 
them will be assigned to NATO.
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NATO new dual-track approach and the German debate 
on tactical nuclear weapons
On August 2, 2019, the INF treaty became history. The United States had withdrawn 
from the accord because it believes Russia violated it by testing and fielding a ground-
launch cruise missile of a range between 500 to 5,500 kilometres, the 9M729. Though some 
Allies were uneasy with the US decision to nix the treaty, NATO eventually supported the 
US non-compliance findings and the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw [8].
In response to INF treaty’s demise, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has re-
peatedly emphasized that the Alliance does not want “to mirror” Russian nuclear policies. 
NATO allies have stated that they do not see a need, and have no intention to deploy ad-
ditional nuclear weapons in Europe. Details of NATO’s agreed military measures remain 
classified but would include strengthening air and missile defence as well as advanced 
conventional capabilities, and “additional steps to keep the NATO nuclear deterrent safe, 
secure and effective” [9]. At the same time, NATO has declared its readiness to engage 
Russia on arms control.
German decision-makers and the government generally support this approach which 
broadly resembles the dual-track decision of 1979, with its mix of military steps and dip-
lomatic initiatives to induce Russia to negotiate on nuclear weapons. Thus, Conserva-
tive member of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the German Bundestag, Nikolas Löbel 
(CDU), in a June 2019 Parliamentary debate argued that the dual tracks of “dialogue and 
nuclear deterrence” must go hand in hand with a unified NATO approach on tactical nu-
clear weapons because “Russia wants to drive a wedge between the United States and Eu-
rope, weaken NATO and divide Europeans among themselves. If we were to unilaterally 
renounce the possibility of nuclear deterrence [sic], we as NATO would not be speaking 
with one voice and would play into Russia’s hands” [10]3.
Deterrence of Russia and forward-deployed nuclear weapons
The German debate on nuclear deterrence has always been characterized by a some-
what artificial distinction between nuclear weapons as “political weapons” of war pre-
vention and a rejection of the notion of such weapons as war-fighting tools, as German 
analyst Peter Rudolf has aptly observed. This applies to the role of US nuclear weapons 
deployed in Europe, too. Decision-makers may highlight the value of forward-deployed 
nuclear weapons in maintaining strategic stability and preventing conflict. However, they 
shy away from discussing what role tactical weapons may play in conflict, once deterrence 
has failed. This separation of arguments reflects an uneasiness of discussing nuclear deter-
rence more broadly [11, p. 23].
Also, participants on both sides of the debate on nuclear sharing quite often talk past 
each other, for example by focussing their arguments on different actors. Thus, opponents 
of the deployment of the continued deployment of US nuclear weapons tend to speak 
more frequently about US nuclear weapons policies. For example, the Green spokes-
woman on disarmament Katja Keul when criticising the lowering of the nuclear threshold 
3 All statements and quotes by German decision-makers and experts have been translated by the 
author, unless indicated otherwise.
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in the US 2018 nuclear posture review, argued that “the US President has changed his [sic] 
nuclear strategy in order to make future nuclear wars manageable and winnable” [12].
Nuclear sharing critics often argue that the actual use of forward deployed nuclear 
weapons by NATO is not a realistic option. For example, in a May 7, 2020 Parliamentary 
debate Keul asked whether anybody “seriously wants to explain use of a nuclear weapon 
between Büchel and Moscow, which would affect us all”. Keul argued that, to her, such an 
option appears more naïve than “the realism of proponents of a withdrawal” [13].
By contrast, proponents of maintaining current sharing arrangements argue that 
Moscow’s aggressive policies should be at the centre of the debate4. Analysts are concerned 
that Moscow may view nuclear weapons as instruments to win a military conflict in Eu-
rope. Nuclear sharing supporters argue that in a potential military conflict with Russia, the 
US nuclear weapons assigned to NATO would have an important role to play by providing 
a means of signalling intent and escalation control. Thus, Joachim Krause, director of the 
conservative Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University, maintains that, together with 
the new US sea-based low-yield weapons the nuclear weapons deployed in Europe should 
provide “a serious” capability to deter such a Russian escalation strategy [13].
Occasionally, experts supportive of sharing arrangements spell out what such a role 
for US nuclear weapons might entail. Thus, former Assistant Secretary General of NATO 
for defence policy and force planning Heinrich Brauss, argues that de facto the principles 
underlying NATO’s Cold War nuclear strategy of flexible response are valid again today 
[14]. Flexible response entailed a military role for nuclear weapons in rolling back a Soviet 
conventional attack in Europe.
While analysts may muse about military missions for nuclear weapons, German deci-
sion-makers prefer to remain more ambiguous about such requirements for NATO nuclear 
weapons. The conservative member of the Bundestag’s Foreign Affairs Committee Johan 
Wadephul, in response to the Social Democrat’s initiative on nuclear sharing said that 
Russian nuclear threats “are real” and “openly directed at Europe”, and argued that Europe 
must protect itself against them. “US nuclear weapons“, Wadephul argued, “increase for 
Russia the risk of retaliation” in case Moscow were to use its tactical nuclear weapons “and 
therefore result in more security for us in Europe” [15]. Volker Ullrich, deputy member of 
the Foreign Affairs Committee (CDU/CSU), in a similar vein said that “we need tactical 
nuclear weapons to define red lines”. Because Russia deploys missiles in Kaliningrad and 
has changed its nuclear strategy, Ullrich stated “NATO needs a clear potential to say: this 
is a red line. From here on, we act together to defend freedom and security” [16].
In addition, there is a widespread concern that Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons would 
provide it with the ability to coerce NATO. For example, Nils Schmid, speaker for the Social 
Democrats on foreign policy in Parliament, wrote on May 5, 2020 in the German newspaper 
Der Tagesspiegel that “nuclear sharing must be seen in connection with the nuclear weapons 
deployed in the European part of Russia. We must not ignore this threat and the nuclear 
modernization strategy of Russia, or Europe will be susceptible to blackmail” [17].
Arms control, tactical nuclear weapons and the reciprocity paradigm
Germany wants to pursue nuclear disarmament through a step-by-step process 
of reciprocal reductions. This also applies to the goal of reducing disparities in tactical 
4 The current NATO policy is described in general terms here [12].
Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2021. Т. 14. Вып. 1 87
nuclear weapon stockpiles in Europe. German decision-makers see an arms control ac-
cord based on mutual obligations by Moscow and Washington as the most likely way to 
achieve reductions of nuclear weapons arsenals in Europe5.
Until 2010, there was some ambiguity whether reciprocal steps should be seen as the 
best basis or precondition for nuclear reductions. After all, the most dramatic cuts of tacti-
cal nuclear weapons stockpiles had happened in the early 1990s through unilateral Presi-
dential Nuclear Initiatives6. The logic of applying the principle of reciprocal reductions to 
nuclear weapons in Europe is also not self-evident because 
the United States and Russia have never employed their nonstrategic nuclear weapons to 
counter, or balance, the nonstrategic nuclear weapons of the other side. For NATO during the 
Cold War and for Russia in more recent years, these weapons have served to counter perceived 
weaknesses and an imbalance in conventional forces. As a result, there has been little interest, 
until recently, in calculating or creating a balance in the numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons 
[20, p. 37].
In September 2009, the incoming Conservative-Liberal German government pledged 
to “advocate within the Alliance and with our American allies the removal of the remain-
ing nuclear weapons from Germany” [21, p. 170]. Initially, the government’s position on 
the requirement for reciprocal Russian steps was somewhat vague. The government’s pro-
gramme stated that Germany was “committed to supporting new disarmament and arms 
control agreements internationally” and wanted “to use the review conference on the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2010 to provide new impetus for contract-based regula-
tions” [21, p. 170]. But it did not explicitly make a new arms control agreement with Russia 
a precondition for changes in the Alliance’s nuclear posture.
This ambivalence evaporated once Germany took the issue of a withdrawal of US 
nuclear weapons to NATO. In discussions among Allies, it soon became clear, that the idea 
of unilateral steps did not receive unanimous support. Germany backtracked and subse-
quently the Alliance agreed in the 2010 Strategic Concept that
[i]n any future reductions, [NATO’s] aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase 
transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the ter-
ritory of NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater 
Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons [22, para 26].
NATO’s 2012  Deterrence and Defense Posture Review report was even clearer by 
stating that
NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear 
weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account 
the greater Russian stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area 
[23, para 26].
Even if different understandings in Germany and among Allies of what reciprocity 
might actually entail persisted [24], the paradigm of mutual reductions has since framed 
the German government’s position and the mainstream debate on nuclear issues. Thus, 
the 2013 Social Democrat-Conservative government’s programme stated that “successful 
5 Already in 2010, the Bundestag in a cross-party resolution expressed its hope that Russia and the 
United States would negotiate a post-New START agreement on the complete and verifiable elimination of 
substrategic nuclear weapons [18].
6 Looking beyong the PNIs, unilateral nuclear cuts have happened quite often [19].
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disarmament talks create the precondition for a withdrawal of the tactical nuclear weapons 
deployed in Germany and in Europe” [25], a formula echoed in the 2018 programme7.
When the Social Democrat leadership in May 2020  questioned whether Germany 
should acquire new nuclear-capable aircraft, it put the issue squarely in the context of 
NATO — Russia relations. Rolf Mützenich wrote:
[W]e are under no illusion when it comes to Russian politics and the destabilisation and dan-
gers to security policy that come from it. Nor are we turning a blind eye to Russian armament and 
the large number of Russian tactical nuclear weapons that pose a direct threat to Europe. This is 
why we have been campaigning for a disarmament treaty on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe 
for many years [27].
The head of the Social Democrat Parliamentary group stated a clear preference for 
arms control as the way forward to address tactical nuclear weapons:
In light of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons stored in Russia and the stationing of the 
new Iskander intermediate-range ballistic missiles that led to the termination of the INF Treaty, 
disarmament and arms control are more important than ever. We need a new multilateral INF 
Treaty and complete disarmament of all tactical nuclear weapons [27].
The 2020  debate differed from previous discussions on nuclear sharing insofar as 
many experts and decision-makers distinguished between two concepts, namely the add-
ed value of the forward-deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe on the one hand, 
and the importance of nuclear sharing consultative mechanisms on the other. Opponents 
of the continued involvement in the forward deployment argued that the weapons sta-
tioned in Europe had lost their political and military significance. But they did not ques-
tion the value nuclear consultations and emphasized the importance of NATO consensus 
in deciding on changes to the Alliance’s nuclear posture.
This did not prevent proponents of the nuclear status quo to accuse them of “unilat-
eralism”. Thus, Roderich Kiesewetter in a February 2019 Bundestag debate pointedly said 
that
Russia is filling its arsenals with new nuclear missiles, refuses any insights into whether 
these weapons violate the INF treaty, and the Socialist Party [i. e. Die Linke, The Left Party, not 
Mützenich’s SPD; Oliver Meier] wants the West and NATO to empty the shelves. What kind of 
disarmament debate is this where one side is increasing nuclear weapons and the other side is 
expected to disarm? [28]
In line with the reciprocity paradigm, many also see US nuclear weapons deployed in 
Europe as a bargaining chip in future negotiations with Russia. For example, Karl-Heinz 
Brunner, convenor of the Social Democrats in the Bundestag’s subcommittee on disar-
mament, arms control and non-proliferation, compared the nuclear weapons assigned to 
NATO to a joker in game of cards:
How could Germany [sic] relinquish nuclear weapons and say: “We give up and now 
have a better negotiating position with the Russian Federation while they have a warhead in 
Kaliningrad?” I have to have something in my quiver in order to be able to negotiate. […] 
7 For example, the 2018 government programme echoes NATO language by stating that “successful 
disarma-ment talks create the condition for a withdrawal of the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in 
Germany and Europe” [26].
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If I want to disarm, I have to have capacities to negotiate and to initiate negotiations and that is 
what nuclear sharing is for [29].
In a similar vein, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas (SPD) criticised his party 
colleagues for pushing the debate on nuclear sharing. He argued that Germany is working 
“with all its power” toward arms control agreements [30], implying that the discussion 
about withdrawal might be undercutting the government’s arms control efforts.
However, German decision-makers rarely specify which type of arms control agree-
ment on tactical nuclear weapons they would like to see. Thus, it is not clear whether they 
would prefer a stand-alone agreement on non-strategic nuclear weapons or a more com-
prehensive arms control accord. The latter approach would be consistent with the Trump 
administration’s push for a new nuclear arms control accord with Russia and China that 
would cover all types of nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons [31].
The German government merely argues that “[e]ffective arrangements like the New 
START Treaty should <…> be preserved and, where needed, developed further” as the 
Federal Government’s Deputy Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament said 
at the 2019 NPT Preparatory Committee [32]. In a June 2020 press conference, a For-
eign Office spokesperson elaborated that a widening of the arms control agenda should 
involve China and also “take additional Russian nuclear weapons into focus” [33]. But 
it remains unclear, when and how tactical nuclear weapons should be brought into the 
arms control fold8.
Frameworks for facilitating progress on tactical nuclear weapons
What are the implications of these views in Germany on Russian nuclear policies, 
deterrence and arms control for the prospects of facilitating reductions in the number 
and roles of such weapons? In the short-term, it seems unlikely that Russia and the United 
States will launch separate talks on tactical nuclear weapons. There are, however, four 
other frameworks in which transparency, confidence-building and reductions of tactical 
nuclear weapons could be discussed with Russia, namely
 — the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT);
 — other multilateral fora;
 — the Russian — US bilateral dialogue on strategic stability;
 — the NATO  —  Russia Council.
Tactical nuclear weapons and the NPT
In the context of the NPT, the nuclear weapon states have promised to “[a]ddress the 
question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part 
of the general nuclear disarmament process” and thus are committed to also talk about 
tactical nuclear weapons reductions [34]. However, Russia and the United States have been 
mostly arguing that the other side’s tactical nuclear weapons have to be reduced, while 
showing no willingness to talk about their own stockpiles. Russia views a withdrawal of 
US nuclear weapons from Europe as a precondition for engaging in talks on its stockpile 
8 On the different arms control options for addressing tactical nuclear weapons see [20].
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of tactical nuclear weapons [35, p. 10f.]. Vice versa, the United States wants to address Rus-
sia’s numerical advantage in tactical nuclear weapons before it would consider new arms 
control agreements [36].
Russia for some time has framed NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements also as a le-
gal NPT issue. At the 2019 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting of NPT States Parties, 
Moscow described “so-called” nuclear sharing as “[o]ne of the most serious challenges to 
the nuclear regime” and argued that these arrangements contradict the treaty’s spirit and 
letter. Moscow repeated its long-standing demand that all “nuclear-weapon States should 
withdraw nuclear weapons to their territories, eliminate any infrastructure in place out-
side their borders that enables the rapid deployment of such weapons, and discontinue 
preparations for such deployment that involve non-nuclear-weapon States” [37, para 15].
This framing of NATO nuclear sharing does not resonate in Berlin. German govern-
ments have steadily subscribed to the view that nuclear sharing arrangements are consist-
ent with the NPT because they existed before the treaty was concluded and that states 
parties were well aware of them when they joined9. Opposition parties and the peace 
movement at times have taken a different position on the legality of nuclear sharing ar-
rangements. Their arguments, however, rarely made it into the political mainstream10.
By contrast, the question of whether nuclear sharing fosters or hampers nuclear pro-
liferation is occasionally debated in Berlin. In 2010, the then-German government did see 
its initiative to advocate withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe as a way to prop up 
the NPT. But since then, officials have tip-toed around the question of whether changes to 
NATO’s nuclear posture would strengthen the non-proliferation regime11. Many, however, 
believe that nuclear sharing and the forward-basing of nuclear weapons have prevented 
and do prevent nuclear proliferation in Europe. Historically, West-Germany’s 1975 ratifi-
cation of the NPT went hand-in-hand with a decision to forego the option of developing 
its own nuclear weapons. NATO nuclear sharing enabled NPT proponents to argue that 
such arrangements provided Bonn with an alternative way of influencing the Alliance’s 
nuclear policies.
There is a corresponding concern that changes in nuclear sharing arrangements could 
lead to a relocation of US nuclear weapons to other countries. Thus, Roderich Kiesewetter 
in October 2018 maintained that host nations take on a special responsibility by provid-
ing security guarantees for other European countries. He argued that “nuclear sharing 
prevents the spread of nuclear weapons” citing the scenario that US nuclear weapons de-
ployed in Germany could be relocated to Poland in case Germany were to unilaterally 
terminate basing arrangements with the United States [40].
There is a concern about the implications of such proliferation on NATO — Rus-
sia relations. For example, Heinrich Brauss warned that a relocation of nuclear weap-
ons deployed in Germany to Poland would likely spell the end of the NATO — Russia 
Founding Act [14].
9 A more interesting question is whether similar European arrangement on nuclear weapons would be 
compati-ble with the NPT. On both questions see the report of the Bundestag’s research service [38].
10 See for example [39].
11 Experts and observers sometimes mentioned this in the context of preventing a possible nuclear 
sharing be-tween Pakistan and Saudi Arabia or preventing the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in 
Belarus but these arguments have rarely made it into the political sphere.
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Tactical nuclear weapons and other multilateral fora
Tactical nuclear weapon reductions can be discussed in a range of other multilateral 
fora including during meetings of the Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarma-
ment initiative (CEND), the United Nations First Committee or the Conference on Dis-
armament. Russia, while participating in these frameworks, appears to have a preference 
for discussing nuclear weapons issues with its nuclear weapon states peers, for example in 
meetings with the permanent members of the Security Council (P5).
Germany participates in several groups of like-minded states which have at times 
addressed tactical nuclear weapons-related issues. More transparency on tactical nuclear 
weapons postures and nuclear doctrines has been one of Berlin’s consistent goals in these 
discussions. Nuclear risk reduction has recently moved up Germany list of priorities.
From a German perspective, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative 
(NPDI) remains the most important initiative of like-minded states. The cross-regional 
group, consisting of 12 states, was founded in 2010 to facilitate agreement at the NPT Re-
view Conference12. Initially, progress on tactical nuclear weapons was one of the key issues 
for the NPDI. For example, at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, NPDI members called 
on possessor states to include such weapons in the arms control process, review deploy-
ment postures and provide more transparency [41].
NPDI members have taken up these issues in their dialogue with the P5. Apparently, 
they have had only limited success in eluding disarmament commitments from this group 
and the “interaction has not gone beyond ad hoc discussions” [42, p. 14]. Nevertheless, the 
P5 among themselves would be the logical forum for agreeing on reciprocal steps related 
to tactical nuclear weapons. Such an agreement, for example on transparency measures, 
would be noted in Berlin and might pave the way for NATO to discuss further arms con-
trol measures.
Berlin sees nuclear weapons postures increasingly from a risk reduction perspective. 
Decision-makers are worried about the dangers of accidents or unintended use of nu-
clear weapons, particularly in Europe. In November 2019, the CEND participants agreed 
on a two-year programme of work and decided to set up three working groups. One of 
these working groups, co-chaired by Finland and Germany, is looking at potential interim 
measures to reduce risks related to nuclear weapons. This could be a useful setting for the 
42 participant states to discuss and agree on specific measures such as separation of war-
heads from delivery vehicles, and other risk reduction measures related to tactical nuclear 
weapons [43]. Risk reduction is also seen as an important issue by the 15 members of the 
Stockholm Initiative, who have outlined a number of steps to “[minimize] the risk of con-
flict and accidental nuclear weapon use” [44].
Tactical nuclear weapons and the Russian — US Strategic Stability Talks
Germany has encouraged Russia and the United States to make progress in their bi-
lateral nuclear arms control discussions. Berlin would like to see Moscow and Washington 
extend the New START Treaty, as a basis for addressing tactical nuclear weapons. The 
United States, however, has linked New START extension to a broadening of the strategic 
12 The NPDI members are Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, 
Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.
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arms control remit. Specifically, the Trump administration wants China to join the Rus-
sia — US arms control process and aims for a new agreement to cover all types of nuclear 
weapons which would include Russia’s new types of nuclear weapons and tactical nuclear 
weapons.
Russia, by contrast, has offered an unconditional extension of New START, putting 
Berlin and other NATO allies in the politically uncomfortable position of being closer to 
Moscow than Washington on this question.
Russia has deflected calls for reductions of its own arsenals by instead calling for the 
inclusion of France and the United Kingdom into a future arms control debate [45]. Few 
in Berlin, however, would expect London or Paris to join multilateral arms control talks 
any time soon [4].
The Russia — US strategic arms control dialogue could, however, become a venue for 
addressing tactical nuclear weapons. Moscow and Washington agreed on June 22, 2020 to 
establish three working groups in the context of the Strategic Stability talks, namely mili-
tary capabilities and doctrines, transparency verification and space security. Technical ex-
perts in these three groups started actual discussions and in principle the first two groups 
could address issues related to tactical nuclear weapons.
In the future, the scope of such talks could be broadened to address concerns of both 
sides, including strategic offensive arms, non-strategic systems, space security and missile 
defence and risk reduction. Such “multitrack negotiations would open up opportunities 
to link changes in NATO’s nuclear posture to measures on reducing nuclear risks” which 
might include geographical limits on deployments [46, p. 7].
Tactical nuclear weapons and the NATO — Russia dialogue
Until 2014, the NATO — Russia Council had been a key venue for discussions be-
tween the Alliance and Russia on nuclear confidence-building and arms control. Both 
sides made some progress on issues such as nuclear doctrines and definitions, nuclear 
safety and security [47]. NATO members suspended these interactions when Russia an-
nexed Crimea, though the NATO — Russia Council Ambassadors still meet occasion-
ally13.
Many in Berlin would prefer to see the NATO — Russia dialogue to be expanded 
beyond its current format. Thus, Foreign Minister Heiko Maas in a June 2018 keynote 
highlighted that he personally had pushed for a resumption of discussions with Russia 
at the political level and argued that the NATO — Russia Council “needs to continue to 
place a strong focus on matters of risk reduction and transparency” [49]. He argued in 
April 2019 that “[a]ll the criticism of Russia does not mean that we don’t need dialogue, 
too. A dialogue to manage those difficult relations and prevent unintended escalation. 
That’s why we need not only the NATO — Russia Council, but also direct channels of 
communication between our militaries” [50].
Russia could facilitate such a move by specifying its offer of increased transparency 
in the context of discussions of a post-INF deployment moratorium [51]. Thus, Moscow 
could underpin its commitment to the central storage of warheads for tactical nuclear 
13 The NATO — Russia Council website remains frozen in time. The state of affairs in early 2014 can 
be viewed at [48].
Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2021. Т. 14. Вып. 1 93
weapons by making these sites subject to monitoring or verification. This might resonate 
with Parliamentarians who have shown interest in the concept of a deployment morato-
rium for nuclear weapons in Europe but have made such a moratorium dependent on 
strict verification14.
Conclusion
Russia and the United States need to move beyond finger-pointing in order to pre-
vent a new arms race in Europe on tactical nuclear weapons and reduce the risks associ-
ated with the continued deployment of these weapons in Europe. The German debate on 
nuclear sharing has shown that there is a willingness in Berlin to reconsider the current 
NATO practice of forward deployment of nuclear weapons. However, any changes to NA-
TO’s nuclear posture would likely happen only if agreed upon by all Alliance members and 
would be more likely in the context reciprocal actions by Russia15. A close reading of the 
German debate shows that unilateral changes to NATO’s nuclear posture remain unlikely.
Russia frames NATO nuclear sharing arrangements as incompatible with the NPT, 
thus suggesting unilateral steps by the Alliance to change its nuclear posture. If Moscow 
were to frame the issue of nuclear reductions in Europe in the reciprocity paradigm, would 
increase the likelihood that Germans would be receptive to the idea. Otherwise, Russia 
runs the risk of appearing to raise worn-out demands and positions that have little rel-
evance for political debates around arms control. The argument that sharing arrangements 
are at odds with the spirit and letter of the NPT does not gain any traction in European 
debates and is unlikely to do so in the future.
Russia could also consider providing more transparency on the storage of its tactical 
nuclear weapons. Many in Germany worry about possible nuclear deployments close to 
NATO borders. Kaliningrad is of particular concern because Central and Eastern Europe-
an countries, including parts of Germany, are within the 500 km range of nuclear-capable 
Iskander missiles deployed there. It can be assumed that under normal operating proce-
dures, nuclear warheads are not deployed at forward bases such as Kaliningrad. Russia 
itself has stated that in peacetime it stores warheads away from nuclear delivery vehicles 
and a NATO official has recently acknowledged this separate storage [12]. President Pu-
tin’s 26 October 2020 proposal to agree on verification measures “to confirm the absence 
of ground-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles” at certain sites, including in 
Kaliningrad and NATO missile defense sites is a useful step in this direction [54].
Finally, Russia and the United States should brief non-nuclear weapon states more 
regularly on (the lack of) progress made in their bilateral Strategic Stability Talks and on 
discussions they are having among nuclear weapon states within the scope of P5 talks. 
Such engagement would be an indication of Russia’s willingness to be more open con-
cerning its nuclear weapons policy and live up to its commitment to reduce the role and 
number of tactical nuclear weapons [55].
References
1. Meier, O. (2020), German Politicians Renew Nuclear Basing Debate, Arms Control Today, vol. 50 (5), 
pp. 36–37.
14 See for example [52].
15 For a comprehensive proposal see for example [53].
94 Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2021. Т. 14. Вып. 1
2. Lutsch, A. (2016), Merely ‘Docile Self-Deception’? German Experiences with Nuclear Consultation in 
NATO, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 535–558.
3. Lunn, S. (2018), NATO Nuclear Sharing: Consultation, in Andreasen, S. Williams, I., Rose, B., Kris-
tensen, H. M. and Lunn, S. (eds.), Building a Safe, Secure, and Credible NATO Nuclear Posture. Washington, 
D. C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative, pp. 41–46.
4. Meier, O. (2020), Why Germany Won’t Build its Own Nuclear Weapons and Remains Skeptical of a 
Eurodeterrent, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1–9.
5. Kramp-Karrenbauer, A. (2020), Second Keynote Speech by German Federal Minister of Defence. Ham-
burg, November 19. Available at: https://www.bmvg.de/en/news/second-keynote-speech-german-minister-
of-defence-akk-4503976 (accessed: 04.12.2020).
6. Gottemoeller, R. (2017), NATO’s Enduring Commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Lecture by 
NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller. May 5. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/na-
tohq/opinions_143493.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed: 11.09.2020).
7. Kristensen, H. M. and Korda, M. (2019), Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
vol. 75, no. 5, pp. 252–261.
8. Statement on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Issued by the NATO Foreign Min-
isters. Press Release, December 4, 2018, (162), NATO, Brussels. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/official_texts_161122.htm (accessed: 11.09.2020).
9. Stoltenberg, J. (2020), Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Following the Meet-
ings of NATO Defence Ministers. June 17, NATO, Brussels. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
opinions_176520.htm (accessed: 11.09.2020).
10. Nikolas, L. (2019), Plenarprotokoll 19/107. Deutscher Bundestag, June 27. Available at: https://dipbt.
bundestag.de/dip21/btp/19/19107.pdf (accessed: 11.09.2020)
11. Rudolf, P. (2020), Deutschland, die Nato und die nukleare Abschreckung. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik. Berlin (SWP Studie 2020/11).
12. Cox, J. (2020), Nuclear Deterrence Today, Nato Review, June 8. Available at: https://www.nato.int/
docu/review/articles/2020/06/08/nuclear-deterrence-today/index.html (accessed: 11.09.2020).
13. Krause, J. (2020), Die Neue Nukleare Frage — eine Antwort auf Rolf Mützenich. Bonn: Gesellschaft für 
Sicherheitspolitik (GSP-Einblick, 5/2020).
14. Brauss, H. (2020), Rolf Mützenich hat Unrecht. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 5. Available at: 
https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/atom-debatte-in-der-spd-rolf-muetzenich-hat-unrecht-16757761.
html?GEPC=s3 (accessed: 11.09.2020).
15. Wadephul, J. (2020), Nukleare Teilhabe Unverzichtbar. Pressemitteilung CDU/CDU Bundestagsfrak-
tion, May 2. Available at: https://www.cducsu.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/wadephul-nukleare-teilhabe-
unverzichtbar (accessed: 11.09.2020).
16. Ullrich, V. (2020), Plenarprotokoll 19/166. Deutscher Bundestag, June 18, 2020. Available at: https://
dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/19/19166.pdf (accessed: 11.09.2020).
17. Schmid, N. (2020), Wir Brauchen die Debatte über die Nukleare Teilhabe, Der Tagesspiegel, May 
5. Available at: https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/atomwaffen-in-deutschland-wir-brauchen-die-debatte-
ueber-die-nukleare-teilhabe/25802096.html (accessed: 11.09.2020).
18. Deutschland muss deutliche Zeichen für eine Welt frei von Atomwaffen setzen (2010), Antrag der Frak-
tionen CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, March 25 (Drucksache 17/1159). Available 
at: http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/17/17035.pdf (accessed: 11.09.2020)
19. Woolf, A. (2002), Arms Control and Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Unilateral vs. Bilateral Reductions. 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS Report RL31222), May 16.
20. Woolf, A. (2020), Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service 
(CRS Report RL32572), May 4.
21. Growth. Education. Unity. The Coalition Agreement Between the CDU, CSU and FDP for the 17th 
Legislative Period. October 6, 2009. Berlin. Available at: http://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/
dokumente/091215-koalitionsvertrag-2009-2013-englisch_0.pdf (accessed: 11.09.2020).
22. NATO (2010), Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of 
the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon. 
Lisbon, November 19. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm (accessed: 
11.09.2020).
23. NATO (2012), Deterrence and Defence Posture Review. Chicago, May 20. Available at: http://www.
nato.int/cps/en/SID-D2530093-661337FA/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm?mode=pressrelease (accessed: 
11.09.2020).
Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2021. Т. 14. Вып. 1 95
24. Meier, O. and Lunn, S. (2014), Trapped: NATO, Russia, and the Problem of Tactical Nuclear Weap-
ons, Arms Control Today, vol. 44 (1–2), pp. 18–24.
25. Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD. 18. Legislaturperi-
ode. 2013, Berlin. Available at: https://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/dokumente/koalitionsvertrag.
pdf (accessed: 11.09.2020).
26. Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland. Ein neuer Zusammenhalt 
für unser Land. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD.19. Legislaturperiode. 2018, Berlin. Avail-
able at: https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/975226/847984/5b8bc23590d4cb2892b31c987ad67
2b7/2018-03-14-koalitionsvertrag-data.pdf?download=1 (accessed: 11.09.2020).
27. Mützenich, R. (2020), Germany and Nuclear Sharing, International Politics and Society, May 15. 
Available at: https://www.ips-journal.eu/regions/europe/article/show/germany-and-nuclear-sharing-4362/ 
(accessed: 11.09.2020).
28. Kiesewetter, R. (2019), Plenarprotokoll 19/078. Deutscher Bundestag, February 1. Available at: http://
dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/19/19078.pdf (accessed: 11.09.2020).
29. Brunner, K.-H. (2020), Plenarprotokoll 19/166. Deutscher Bundestag, June 18. Available at: https://
dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/19/19166.pdf (accessed: 11.09.2020).
30. Schult, C. (2020), Maas gegen ‚deutschen Sonderweg‘ bei Atomwaffen, Spiegel Online, May 4. Avail-
able at: https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/heiko-maas-gegen-deutschen-sonderweg-bei-atom-
waffen-a-52e164f1-5f3a-4d84-8e31-357df9432a18 (accessed: 11.09.2020).
31. United States Department of State (2020), Online Press Briefing with Ambassador Marshall Bill-
ingslea, Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control, And Lieutenant General Thomas A. Bussiere, Deputy 




32. Statement by Ambassador Rüdiger Bohn, Deputy Federal Government Commissioner for Disarma-
ment and Arms Control, Head of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany at the Preparatory Com-
mittee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap-
ons. New York, April 30, 2019. Available at: statements.unmeetings.org/media2/21491985/germany-new.pdf 
(accessed: 11.09.2020).
33. Federal Foreign Office (2020), Erklärungen des Auswärtigen Amts in der Regierungspressekonferenz 
vom 24.06. Berlin. Available at: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/regierungspressekonferenz
/2357582#content_5 (accessed: 11.09.2020).
34. 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Final 
Document, vol. I (NPT/CONF. 2010/50 (Vol. I)). Available at: https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2010/50%20 
(VOL.I) (accessed: 11.09.2020).
35. Zagorski, A. (2011), Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Posture, Politics and Arms Control, Ham-
burger Beiträge zur Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, February, Bd. 156.
36. Steve, P. (2020) Unattainable conditions for New START Extension?, Brookings Institute, July 1. Avail-
able at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/07/01/unattainable-conditions-for-new-
start-extension/ (accessed: 11.09.2020).
37. Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Pro-
liferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear Disarmament. Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation 
(NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.6). Available at: https://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.6 (accessed: 
11.09.2020).
38. Research Services of the German Bundestag (2017), Völkerrechtliche Verpflichtungen Deutschlands 
beim Umgang mit Kernwaffen. Deutsche und europäische Ko-Finanzierung ausländischer Nuklearwaffenpo-
tentiale (Sachstand, WD 2-3000-013/17). Available at: https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/513080/
c9a903735d5ea334181c2f946d2cf8a2/wd-2-013-17-pdf-data.pdf (accessed: 11.09.2020).
39. Ambos, K. and Lippold, M. (2020), Von der Abschreckung zur Abrüstung, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, June 22. Available at: https://www.faz.net/einspruch/atomwaffen-von-der-abschreckung-zur-abru-
estung-16827032.html (accessed: 11.09.2020).
40. Kiesewetter, R. (2018), Plenarprotokoll 19/058. Deutscher Bundestag. October 18, 2018. Available at: 
https://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/19/19058.pdf (accessed: 11.09.2020).
41. Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative. Recommendations for consideration by the 2015 Re-
view Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Joint working paper 
submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.16). 
New York, 2015.
96 Вестник СПбГУ. Международные отношения. 2021. Т. 14. Вып. 1
42. Hoell, M. (2019), The P5 Process: Ten Years On. London: European Leadership Network (Global Se-
curity Policy Brief), September. Available at: https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/09/190925-P5-Process-Max-Hoell-FINAL-2.0-1.pdf (accessed: 11.09.2020).
43. Bugos, S. (2019), US Hosts Nuclear Disarmament Working Group, Arms Control Today, Septem-
ber. Available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-09/news/us-hosts-nuclear-disarmament-working-
group (accessed: 11.09.2020).
44. Federal Foreign Office (2020), The NPT at 50. Advancing Nuclear Disarmament, Securing Our Future. 
Berlin, February 25. Available at: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/npt-50/2310112 
(accessed: 11.09.2020). 
45. Gould, J. (2020), Ball’s in Russia’s Court on New START Extension, Says DoD Official, Defense News, 
September 2. Available at: https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2020/09/02/balls-in-russias-court-on-
new-start-extension-says-dod-official (accessed: 11.09.2020).
46. Baklitskiy, A., Bidgood, S. and Meier, O. (2020), Russian — US Strategic Stability Talks: Where they 
are and where they should go, Deep Cuts Commission (Issue Brief/13). Available at: https://deepcuts.org/
files/pdf/Deep_Cuts_Issue_Brief_13-Russian_US_Strategic_Stability_Talks.pdf (accessed: 04.12.2020).
47. Kubiak, K. (2014), NATO and Russia Experiences With Nuclear Transparency and Confidence-Build-
ing Measures. Background Paper for the Workshop “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Transpar-
ency and Confidence-Building Measures in Practice”. Berlin, March 27–28, 2014: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik (SWP Working Paper/2). Available at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/
arbeitspapiere/wp_kubiak_April2014.pdf (accessed: 11.09.2020)
48. NATO  — Russia Council. Available at: https://www.nato.int/nrc-website/en/news/index.html (ac-
cessed: 11.09.2020).
49. Maas, H. (2018), The Future of the Nuclear Order — Challenges for Diplomacy. Speech of the For-
eign Minister at the Tiergarten Conference of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin, June 27. Available at: 
https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/maas-fes-tiergarten-konferenz/2113728 (accessed: 
11.09.2020).
50. Speech by Federal Foreign Minister Heiko Maas at the luncheon held by the American Council on 
Germany (ACG) on “Germany, Europe and the United States: A strategic partnership facing new challenges?”, 
Berlin, April 1, 2019. Available at: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/maas-american-
council-on-germany/2205634 (accessed: 11.09.2020).
51. Podvig, P. (2020), Nuclear Weapons in Europe After the INF Treaty, Deep Cuts Commission (Issue 
Brief/10). Available at: https://deepcuts.org/files/pdf/Deep_Cuts_Issue_Brief_10-NW_Post-INF_Europe.
pdf (accessed: 11.09.2020).
52. Gutschker, T. and Schuller, K. (2019), INF-Vertrag: Auf die andere Seite des Urals, Frankfurter Allge-
meine Sonntagszeitung, February 2. Available at: https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/inf-vertrag-auf-
die-andere-seite-des-urals-16021423.html (accessed: 11.09.2020).
53. Fuhrhop, P., Kühn, U. and Meier, O. (2020), Creating an Opportunity to Withdraw US nuclear 
Weapons From Europe, Arms Control Today, vol. 50 (8), pp. 62–66.
54. President of Russia. Statement by Vladimir Putin on additional steps to de-escalate the situation in 
Europe after the termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). Moscow, October 
26, 2020. Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64270 (accessed: 04.12.2020).
55. Hoell, M. and Meier, O. (2020), Getting P5  strategic risk reduction right: What NATO non-nu-
clear-weapon states seek from nuclear-weapon states, European Leadership Network (Commentary), No-
vember 23. Available at: https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/getting-p5-strategic-
risk-reduction-right-what-nato-non-nuclear-weapon-states-seek-from-nuclear-weapon-states (accessed: 
04.12.2020).
Received: November 14, 2020 
Accepted: December 15, 2020
Au t h o r ’s  i n f o r m a t i o n :
Oliver Meier — Senior Researcher; meier@ifsh.de
